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Counterfactuals and Futures Histories. 
Retrospective Imagining as an Auxiliary for the 
Scenarios of Expectance 
Georg Schmid ∗ 
Abstract: »Ungeschehene Geschichte und Zukunftsgeschichten. Retrospektive 
Vision als Hilfskonstruktion für die Szenarios der Erwartung«. Unquestionable 
as history may seem, there are all the same quite different readings and dispa-
rate inferences despite the same series of facts. This goes to show that even 
professional historians can sometimes be overcome by meditations on past 
possibilities of bifurcations. As to “alternatives to actual history,” is serves 
well to bear in mind that few are plausible, but that belief in a predeterminative 
universe of necessities would certainly be misplaced. Whereas some occur-
rences are clear-cut enough to make us understand which components would 
have had to be changed in order to get a different outcome, others are of such a 
high degree of complexity that attempts to imagine an alternative course and 
divergent results remain rather illusory: the examples of Midway (the former 
type) and the defeat of France in 1940 (intricately overdetermined) clearly 
show that it pays in any case, in defiance to all complexities, to consider past 
potential. It is prerequisite for choosing between future options in more reason-
able and efficient ways than hitherto. 
Keywords: Counterfactual History, Midway, Battle of France, Future Histo-
ries. 
Winston Churchill has famously asked the question what would have happened 
if the South had not won the Civil War (Churchill 1931). This query, simple at 
first sight but remarkably ingenious, demonstrates nearly right away the epis-
temological value of counterfactual investigations. Not least, it ushers in the 
quandary of perspective: hindsight facilitates judgments but forces you to take 
forward movements into account, too. It is a matter of what we could call gen-
eral interpretability. And in order to clarify this notion I’ll talk about the inter-
pretability of war and peace. Wars ‒ and whether and how they could have 
been avoided ‒ indeed are the most notable and consequential “switches” 
where history might have taken another course. And peace is surely tantalizing 
and endlessly challenging to achieve. 
Evidently, the outbreaks of wars are among the historians’ favorite conjunc-
tions: they are amongst the best-documented clusters of historical facts and 
courses of events. Indeed, even their dénouements, the peace treaties, are. All 
the same, even here, perhaps particularly so, divergent readings, reinterpreta-
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tions, all kinds of lingering confusions seem to persist. They indicate that there 
is much uncertainty, thus anxiety despite finally model clarity. Revisionisms of 
all kinds, gradual as well as radical ones, offer ample proof; recently, there has 
been Nicholson Baker’s unpleasant one in regard to World War II. And, of 
course, one of the younger “spiritual fathers” of our counterfactuals, Niall 
Ferguson (though he has traded with other things, too) is to be encountered in 
the vicinity, too: Britain could have “stood aside.” (Ferguson 1997). 
There might be a yearning, at least post factum and psychoanalytically eas-
ily accounted for, to see things turn out differently. They didn’t turn out well; 
what if they had turned out more advantageously ̶ otherwise. All these “other-
wises” have an immense advantage: they cannot be put to the test. It is con-
ceivable that one of the most recent publications on counterfactuals ‒ Explain-
ing War and Peace (Goertz, Levy 2007) ‒ is in fact motivated by a largely pre-
conscious (and hardly acknowledgeable) wish that the twentieth century’s 
“thirty years war” had not taken place. (We could also say, the eighty years 
war, if we comply with Philip Bobbitt [Bobbitt 2002 and 2007].) 
Had that Thirty or Eighty Years War not taken place, in effect, Europe 
would in all probability not have resigned from the premier position in world 
politics and thus history. (Most likely it is premature to speculate about Europe 
regaining that prestigious station because of the seeming downfall of the U.S.: 
Europe, up until the Crisis, has done clearly less well than the U.S. in GDP per 
person as well as in regard to purchasing-power parity and other indicators. 
And as Europe is, at least in terms of population, bigger than the U.S. it can 
also be suspected that it will fall all the harder still.) There is, in Ian Kershaw’s 
words, “no inexorable path to be followed.” (Kershaw 2008) 
It is, I suspect, exactly in these zones that counterfactuals are becoming 
most momentous. They demonstrate that there are always choices to be made, 
that there are alternatives and options, that there is no preordained pattern of 
progression. Kershaw goes on to explicitly say, “This is not counter-factual or 
virtual history of the type which makes an intellectual guessing-game of look-
ing into some distant future and projecting what might have happened had 
some event not taken place.” (Kershaw 2008: 6) It is not devoid of salient irony 
that one sentence later he states: “Nevertheless, it could fairly be claimed that 
historians implicitly operate with short-range counterfactuals in terms of alter-
natives to immediate important occurrences or developments. Otherwise, they 
are unable fully to ascertain the significance of what actually did take place.” 
(Ibid.) We should also note that the future is expressly made reference to; 
moreover, we could remark that there’s much to be said for parlor games of a 
high intellectual standard. 
My examples for presenting some arguments in favor of those constructive, 
ambitious “games” are mindful of the different degrees of possible “counterfac-
tualization.” Jumping ahead a bit, I argue right away that there are some in-
stances where minor changes lead to definitely different outcomes ‒ in rather 
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straightforward situations with but a few decisive actants ‒, whereas it must 
indeed be said that, the more complex the settings get, second (or third, etc., 
etc.: fourth, n-th) degree counterfactuals rapidly pose colossal if, in principle, 
theoretically not insurmountable problems: at which “tier” could you possibly 
stop developing ever more, still more, tendentially infinite alternatives? 
Applying Bobbitt’s schema, we’ll talk about the “Eighty Years War,” the 
second part of which I have termed the second act of the twentieth century’s 
Thirty Years War, World War II then. In regard to the third act (the Cold War) 
and beyond (what some already call the Fourth World War, the War Against 
Terror or The Clash of Civilizations etc.), I’ll leave it at a few interspersed 
remarks. We are in the process of moving on to the next play anyway; we don’t 
know anything yet about the number of its acts.  
The second act of the last Thirty Years War is said to have been enacted (or 
rather reenacted: but that remains to be seen) by countless war games in mili-
tary academies and think tanks and the like without ever delivering the actual 
historical result. In “replaying” those acts, the outcomes typically deviated. 
Course and result appeared to be basically not reproducible. I will, then, 
mainly be talking about Midway and the étrange défaite. 
Midway, no doubt, represents the easier proposition; it lends itself to coun-
terfactualization without setting up major hurdles. Though without doubt deci-
sive for the course of the war ‒ and just possibly its ultimate outcome ‒, the 
interchangeable factors appear to be mainly military ones and are thus consid-
ered to be more readily analyzable. The downfall of France in 1940, on the 
other hand, seems characterized by lots of non-linear constituents which are, 
what is more, widely non-military in nature and generally highly complex. The 
defeat cannot be explained by referring to strategic and tactical considerations 
alone, and French society, mental set-ups and collective mentalities have 
proved to be largely immune to necessary or appropriate adaptations. The other 
way around, nonetheless, it is possible to argue that first-rate French military 
action might have stumped Nazi Germany (which would at least have changed 
the course of the war, if not halted it altogether or have led to another conclu-
sion); whereas at Midway an American attitude, more propitious to improvisa-
tion than the Japanese mental set-up would render possible, surely has to be 
counted among the decisive factors. Imaginably, this American disposition has 
taken shape in an ideal fashion in the person of Raymond Spruance. At any 
rate, both examples ‒ Midway as well as the defeat of France ‒ present first-
class lessons for future action. 
It serves well to remember the exorbitant American numerical inferiority 
during the events leading up to and at Midway: comparing, in sequence, battle-
ships, carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines at the disposal of, first, 
Japan, second, USA the numbers are overwhelming ‒ 11/nil, 8/3, 22/8, 65/18, 
21/25. Just a handful more subs, but practically eight carriers to two, as one of 
the American carriers, the Yorktown, limping, perhaps more of a hindrance than 
 81
being of much help (and then actually lost, sunk on June 7, trying to hobble 
home), had hardly even been repaired after the damages inflicted in the Coral 
Sea just some weeks earlier. An overwhelming Japanese superiority, then and 
in no way a result which had to be expected. 
But it’s probably superfluous to rehash the battle of Midway as such: it is 
too well known, and the account given by Theodore Cook is surely sufficient 
for anyone not specializing in naval history (Cook 2000). Let’s rather look at 
arguments somewhat distinct from the classical military reflections without, 
however, discounting the latter in any way. Some might be familiar with the 
movie Midway, dating from 1976, with Glenn Ford in the role of Spruance and 
Henry Fonda as Chester Nimitz. This somewhat underrated film has clearly 
been intended to contribute to (or, in a sense, even initiate) a Japanese-
American reconciliation which, to be sure, had been going on at that time al-
ready (otherwise that movie would hardly have been conceivable). Still, in 
military matters things positively are of a different caliber. This contribution to 
an attempted integration of Japan into the Western sphere surely represents a 
kind of “correction running counterfactually” to the course actual history has 
taken. 
Basically, we could argue that the Midway film is based on the perfectly 
simple dramaturgical proposal: who’d have thought that such an outcome was 
possible? It is masked, to a certain extent, by model conciliatory gestures ‒ in 
their turn corresponding with the fact that the film was coproduced by Japan, 
and “symbolically” nicely expressed by the fact that the Japanese speak Eng-
lish, too (which, even at that time, wasn’t necessarily standard filmic technique 
anymore: think of, for example, The Great Escape or A Bridge Too Far). And 
there is, for instance, the not just rhetorical question, Have we (the Americans) 
just been luckier, the innuendo being, of course, that "we" have in fact been 
better. 
Which is true. (And it is not a matter of minor importance that Spruance 
taught at Annapolis after the war: although many did who had been much less 
distinguished than he, to say the least.) This, then, is clearly not just a reading 
of the movie. Naturally, Glenn Ford is the “ideal Spruance” ‒ and though a 
small role, and arguably the last of any importance in his long career, Ford 
makes use of it with bravura (witness the one short scene showing his reaction, 
or rather his near-nil reaction when his buddy Charlton Heston crashes his 
crippled fighter on the flight deck of Ford’s carrier). 
In fact, Midway is one of the rather rare instances in history where very 
probably one actant has been decisive. Substitute Spruance (by any other guy, 
even an extremely talented one) ‒ and the whole outcome of Midway is to be 
questioned. If ‒ if ‒ William Halsey hadn’t been taken out of the equation by 
sudden illness, Spruance, who’d had no carrier experience worth speaking of, 
would hardly have gotten command of the two able carriers Enterprise and 
Hornet. Person-centered and fixated you could go on: if Jack Fletcher, in over-
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all command, wouldn’t immediately have ceased it to Spruance when Yorktown 
was shot away from under him, forcing him to change ships.  
But these are points I do not wish to elaborate on in a protracted manner. 
Rather, my main argument is ‒ in a recent book (Schmid 2009) as well as in a 
forthcoming one on the “narrations of our futures” ‒ that these switches (in a 
double sense as I will demonstrate right away) lead to ever more switches (or 
bifurcations): second, tenth, umpteenth tier counterfactuals. And that is, I ar-
gue, a point usually missed or not taken into sufficient consideration. 
Talking of forks: “switches” in railway parlance. If you imagine a switch 
yard (or shunting yard), each switch leads to more switches and more bundles 
of tracks. Consequently, when you select, say, the left track at switch one, you 
get to another switch than the one you’d have gotten to if you’d chosen the 
right track at switch one. In each case, however, the switches lead to still other 
switches, over and over again. ‒ The familiar problem of second-order counter-
factuals. However, the decisive point to keep in mind is that you have no way 
of knowing which “route” (which course) will be chosen after the first choice 
(or selection). The possibilities increase in an exponential curve. They snow-
ball.  
Secondly, the railway metaphors (the mental images they are conjuring up, 
to be precise) are utterly misleading ‒ though extremely popular. Read for 
instance Kershaw, writing about Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet Union: 
“[...] the points were switched irreversibly onto the track [...]” (Kershaw 2008: 
70, my italics). But at the end of the shunting depot all the tracks are combined, 
connected again: the train is formed, “composed” (formed) and destined to roll 
onto the main or trunk line. Here you are: you’re getting the impression that, 
after a number of deviations, everything falls back into a sort of preordained 
pattern of regulated traffic. This is false reasoning.  
There wouldn’t have to be. If we could put all that shunting to the test we’d 
realize that the metaphorical crutch itself is quite unsuitable. The whole idea of 
bundles of tracks ultimately, at the exit of the yard, leading back to the 
mainline, because of the architecture of the shunting yard, is simply nonsense. 
That erroneous logic can be well observed in the reflections about Midway. An 
American defeat would have prolonged the war, they say. Yes, no doubt, but 
eventually, we tend to think, the result would ‒ supposedly ‒ have been much 
the same. Hypothetically, we’d get to the “identical” end result. But this is just 
a supposition: it ain’t necessarily so.  
Consider just two conspicuous items: who is to decree that neither an imag-
inable demoralization a defeat at Midway would have caused nor the necessity 
of transferring enormous amounts of naval equipment from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific would not have had further momentous consequences ‒ many further 
ones, an ever increasing number, the sheer number of which would lead us 
along an arithmetic and possibly infinite series of ever more changes of the 
supposed “ultimate outcome.” The magnitude of these series cannot be esti-
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mated ‒ and their qualitative effects much less: some positions or phases re-
moved from, onwards of the initial bifurcation, some way further along the new 
route and timeline, we’d be somewhere and somewhen else altogether. In fact, 
there is an exponentially proliferating number of timelines and routes. Who is 
to say that “History” would have rerailed itself onto the track we know?  
We should discard metaphors such as this altogether. Before we can do so, 
however, we’ll have to analyze another one ‒ briefly and quickly. Alternate 
historical scenarios are usually imagined somewhat like railway accidents ‒ 
here are the trains again. (Metaphors have an irritating habit of developing a 
sort of autonomy). Trains derail ‒ but, strangely, there is no final disaster, in a 
quite wondrous way, the wrecked trains rerail themselves. Seemingly, they do 
so in order to transport us back to the historical course, the proper track or 
trunk route, we are familiar with. Now, it wouldn’t make much sense to go on 
with these auxiliary constructions were it not for the fact that metaphorizing 
like that is, as I’ve deplored, so frequently the basis for far-reaching deduc-
tions. Just think of Thompson’s “streetcar challenge” (Thompson 2007: 
113sqq.): is it only a matter of streetcars that failed to arrive and of streetcars 
that did arrive (or what alternative catalysts are coming into play)? I do not 
think that a metaphorical crutch like this actually “alter[s] our understanding of 
the explanatory significance of other variables.” (Ibid., 113.)  
I am tempted to respond in a kindred manner ‒ by taking the metaphors se-
riously, realistically. If the F car on Market Street doesn’t arrive (because the 
PCC is blocked behind a slower moving Peter Witt), I simply take one of the 
trolleybuses also using the Market Street corridor, the 5 or 6, say, and I’ll still 
go electric: so we’ve made a “trackless trolley conundrum” out of the “streetcar 
challenge.” Of course, I could also go underground and take a subsurface J, K, 
L, M or N car (the last-mentioned one would even take me to the Giants’ sta-
dium and the Caltrain depot) or go still deeper and take a BART train. 
Seriously. Questionable metaphors such as these can all too easily deterio-
rate into jargon, all together too specialized nomenclature, impressive on first 
sight but ultimately less useful than assumed. Thinking along the lines of “sys-
temic accidents,” for instance, presupposes that there are systems more or less 
given to a status of “accident proneness;” never mind that we can distinguish 
between, say, limited and extensive understanding ‒ because it is inevitably us 
who decide what counts for good or deficient understanding in the case in 
question.  
Regardless of that, any kind of interaction between both nonlinear and com-
plex components results in “chain reactions.” And we cannot even be sure to 
what an extent the arbitrarily designated complex and nonlinear bundles inter-
mingle. Foreseeing things is not dependent on that; categorizations may some-
times be helpful but are not in themselves explicatory agents in regard to deci-
sions and decision-makers. 
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The solution I propose to overcome those snags (I’ve briefly mentioned just 
a couple) is threefold. First, it is necessary to go beyond the thinking in meta-
phors ‒ though there are better ones than forks, shunting yards and arriving 
tramways or other means of transport failing to arrive. We might, for instance, 
think of Michael Flynn’s “forest of times” (Flynn 1998), a metaphor too, if 
there ever was one, but at least a more appropriate one: there is a quasi infinite 
number of sproutings of buds, leaves, twigs from just one sapling (and they 
never again come together again like the tracks of a depot to regain the con-
figuration of just one railway track). Or, as Dennis Lehane has beautifully put 
it, “[...] all those different who-she-could-have-beens fork out like trails before 
us, branching off and branching off [...] (Lehane 2006, 85).”  
Second, it is pertinent to pose the respective questions in reverse. We 
should, to stick to the Midway example, ask what must positively not be 
changed in order to retain the familiar, “authentic” outcome. Paradoxically, we 
could take away a lot of the vessels Yamamoto had for the Aleutians and Mid-
way and still “achieve” an American victory at Midway. However, we must not 
eliminate Spruance (or very probably even reduce him to a lesser role) because 
this would (extremely plausibly) make the vastly superior Japanese forces 
prevail.  
Third, and most importantly, we have to ponder the counterfactuals by com-
paring them to our expectations. This last point merits a profound inspection, a 
close-up, so to speak. The hypothesis is that, in history, we largely see what we 
want to see: without hardly ever realizing it, we at least privilege what we 
crave, relegating, pushing back what is unpleasant. That means not least that 
we project our present-day dispositions and our wishes for the future unto past 
chains of events and their structural arrangement and significatory value. The 
choice of topics, all kinds of taboos and obsessions and the way questions are 
asked (unconsciously preprogramming answers) offer ample proof. And we 
must not disregard that often the motive for “doing” counterfactuals consists in 
an acknowledged or repressed effort to reinterpret parts of history along the 
lines of “preferable alternates” (this is, of course, the space where revisionisms 
of all kinds lie in ambush). 
I propose to take a close look at the étrange défaite which so much puzzled 
Marc Bloch ‒ and not only him. This impression of "strangeness" can be at-
tributed to the contemporary inconceivability that France would not be able to 
repulse Nazi Germany ‒ a lack of likeliness which, in a manner of speaking, 
kept its luster at least in military academies around the world. (Let’s not forget: 
the German general staff was quite loath to go against the famous French 
forces.) It also results from a posteriori reflections on that sensational, devastat-
ing rout which reveal two entirely different, indeed contradictory, readings. 
One of them instills a substitutive plausibility ‒ France repels Germany: World 
War II takes on an entirely different appearance. The other one, in no way 
inconsistent with actuality, affirms that a very quick German victory over 
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France has been inevitable: its “predestinationism,” however, makes History 
appear immutable, inflexible, just kismet, simply something to await and ac-
cept. This explains, of course, why we tend to be in love with counterfactuals: 
basically, most among us, I suspect, dislike kismet. 
The assumption that France’s defensive systems could have been successful 
is based on mainly if not purely military considerations or, to be more precise, 
on the study of strategies and some armament data and the respective evalua-
tions and similar conjectures. (For example: France’s tanks were technically 
not a priori inferior to the German ones, taking into account differences in 
armoring, maximum speed and radius of action; their use in tactical terms, 
however, was asinine; the German planes were much less superior in perform-
ance than is often inferred but more numerous, better supplied and, above all, 
better used.) But what really counts is the general willingness to use arms in 
order to be left in peace, a real readiness to defend public ideas and goods, 
ways of life and moral standards, a basic affirmation of one’s society’s princi-
ples.  
To be sure, the social atmospheric, the status of a community, its inner con-
cord or discord can be imagined differently, alternately, counterfactually, too. 
But that, in most cases and in all likelihood, is not more than retrospective 
wishful thinking. The imaginary substitution of one collective mentality by 
another at any given point in time, requires a veritable in-depth rewriting of 
long portions of the historical processes resulting in clearly differentiable ef-
fects. 
The retrognostic scenario “France defends itself successfully against the 
German aggressor” can be traced to what might be called a generic Allied 
interpretation of history. That is to say, there is a more or less a priori assump-
tion that the “Western democracies” have common interests ‒ and see things 
that way ‒, regularly act in unison, and that their harmonious relationships are 
based on unfailing loyalty. This assumption obviously is dangerously close to a 
sketch of encumbering wish-fulfillment: witness the obnoxious present-day 
discord Europe-America, not caused by genuine divergence of interests but by 
base antipathy. 
Today, it is easy to see that France’s humiliating defeat in 1940 does not sit 
well with the conception, foreign as well as domestic, of French grandeur and 
honneur. But the world wants to believe in France, and the French do anyway, 
if in a convoluted and somewhat aberrant fashion. An honorable country is 
supposed to defend itself impeccably, as best it can, and corresponding with its 
greatness which must manifest itself in military matters as well as in others 
such as culturedness or intellectual life.  
The military clout and actual effectiveness, superfluous to say, demands 
economic affluence which, in the necessary measure, cannot easily be mustered 
by countries less large (“grand”) than supposed. And it cannot be invoked by 
verbal means; political and military greatness cannot simply be stated or sum-
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moned up; insistence on it in the case of its blanket absence is embarrassing 
and draws attention to divergences between pretense and actuality. The French 
catastrophe of 1940 definitely runs counter to most of the preconceived notions 
‒ prejudices indeed ‒ that were held at the time (and, in large part, still are); 
conceited discourses had widely replaced actual ability; the mere phantom of 
greatness obscured a decisive lack of acumen, competence, volition. 
It should be more evident now why I just mentioned expectations. They re-
flect and reverberate, they are interlinked with how past experiences are seen, 
their antecedents inevitably shape them. Past facts, in turn, are interpretatively 
modified in a way so that they can be harmonized with a longed-for immacu-
late ideation of the future, held in check only by pessimism (or rather skepti-
cism), in its bastardized form manifesting itself as morosity and sulkiness. At 
any rate, we have to think in terms of continuity: the French example, perhaps 
because it has so much to do with traditionalism and duration, shows that “his-
torical experience” is irrevocably coupled with evaluation of the present and 
expectations of the future. That means that counterfactuals should be posited as 
hinges or links between a social perception of future possibilities and social 
impressions of the past. 
Continuity and contingency, then. Nothing about 1940, especially France’s 
1940, is comprehensible without reference to la Grande Guerre. And is has not 
become more understandable ever since. Two indicia: in the autumn of 2008, 
once again, for the umpteenth time, France collectively, massively, repetitively 
“celebrated” the war of 1914. Seemingly unconnected to this occurrence, some 
in Europe still adhere to the unacknowledgeable (and contemptible) notion of 
never forgiving the United States to have saved them twice. Perhaps some 
would like to “skip” 1914 in order to be able to leave the Americans out of the 
equation.  
But there are preconditions for speculations, among them the exigency of 
establishing a clear order of “past pluralities” in terms of their probability. 
Difficult if not altogether impossible as it may be to imagine a victorious 
France in 1940, it is still possible to imagine World War I as “avoidable” ‒ thus 
eliminating World War II, at least in the shape we know so well. But this retro-
spective scenario must not be motivated by mere antagonism for the United 
States: if we want it to be serviceable, it has to be based on a substantial num-
ber of alternative factors. 
You see the catch: these two bundles of circumstances ‒ present-day vile 
motives and the complexity of aggregates of assumable differences ‒ are of a 
different order of magnitude and diverge in terms of the respective degrees of 
complication and connectivity. “To argue for the inevitability of World War I 
[...] is an attempt to root the disaster deep in a political culture which all shared 
[...] and upon which all acted in 1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary precipi-
tating the final descent into the maelstrom.” (Schroeder 2007, 193.) Well put. 
Going beyond primitive anti-Americanism, two comments at least intrude 
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nonetheless: a French success in 1940 presupposes defensive preparedness, an 
entirely functional society ‒ and thus an utterly different gestalt of the collec-
tive mentality ‒, whereas, arguably, avoiding 1914 would “merely” presuppose 
a different mentality of the ruling castes.  
Moreover, one could argue that the War’s first act was more about a “con-
cert of powers” and their exalted leaders, though leading promptly to a second 
act of what we could term a “popular” war ‒ of peoples, whole populations, 
then ‒, a clash of two unremittingly different world views: the authoritarian-
totalitarian one and the democratic-capitalistic one. Different orders of magni-
tude, but still interlinked, not only temporally opposed political conceptions, 
democracy versus tyranny, then: an array or alignment today echoed by Occi-
dent versus Fundamentalism. Which, of course, makes us passionate about the 
whole thing, whether we know about it or not.  
It is less difficult to see now that our desire-based “inscriptions” in history 
run in both directions. Think, as an illustration, of France again: in 1940 still 
obsessed (and it is still even today!) with 1914, all the same forced to think 
about the future, if in an entirely gloomy way. To be sure, “1914” doubtlessly 
meant that at least some German politicians really thought in terms of a “Griff 
nach der Weltmacht” ‒ thus being oriented to a (seductive) future. But to what 
an extent and in which way is this still relevant for the future?  
Connections such as these ‒ dreams of world power on the one hand and the 
fraudulent affection for “soft power” ‒ go on. This misleading, dishonest ‒ and 
in a way “counterfactual” ‒ rationalization in the second degree (as though 
verbal conjurations of “soft power” would exculpate the European war-
mongering past) generates self-deception and is also a dead give-away in re-
gard to hidden motives. What’s going on today has to be interpreted both as a 
distant echo of this war in two acts ‒ even going so far as to shrewdly and 
dishonorably, if always a bit occulted, ascribing much blame to America (we 
know the lore, quite conspiracy-leaning, come to that: Churchill and Roosevelt 
as the war mongers) ‒ and also, in regard to ambitions for the future, as an 
utterly unadmittable craving for attaining a sort of status quo ante. 
Traumatizing experiences and impending anxiety see to a strange amalga-
mation on the basis of collective imaginations. But they are never astute 
enough to allow us to completely ‒ actively, so to speak ‒ repress. Let’s take 
another example: the fact that we survived the Cold War, the atom bomb scare, 
the objective probability of complete extermination (the climax of which surely 
has been the Cuban missile crisis) does in no way make us immune to future 
threats (specifically, ABC weapons potentially in the hands of just about eve-
ryone).  
There is an obstacle there which, to the best of my knowledge, has so far 
never been properly addressed, let alone analyzed in a principled way. The 
mutual relations between a “survived past” and a future assumed to be surviv-
able suggest a kind of perfect symmetry where there only is an incomplete one. 
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On the other hand, there seems to be incomparableness because there is just 
one course in the past while there is, in principle, a practically unlimited num-
ber of future prospects.  
But this is erroneous. Here, then, is my main proposition. We have to hold 
on to counterfactuals at all costs ‒ and we have to provide them with the status 
of untouchable epistemological instruments ‒ because, in fact, there are “many 
pasts,” too. All but one of them may be deficient, outright false, often inten-
tionally, criminally misleading ‒ as there are dishonorable, disfiguring “con-
spiratorial readings” of history ‒, but as hardly anyone knows anything about 
the real history, all those crude and often outright insane readings coexist with 
“the real thing” ‒ they do have more concrete influence than sane, rational, 
reasoned and correct accounts. Spoilt, corrupted histories, plural, compete with 
the real one, disfiguring it beyond recognition: but the corrupt appearance more 
often than not is the guiding principle for many. 
In short, there are, in fact, not only countless futures but numerous pasts, 
too. Our tremendous difficulties with preparing ourselves for “the things to 
come” must not only be explained by the logical incompatibility of a unilinear 
(unambiguous) past and a multilinear (assumable) future. They have to take 
into account the falsifying of history, too. 
There are further quandaries, though. Karen Hellekson mentions some of 
them ‒ and in passing I affirm that, personally, I don’t really differentiate too 
much between scholarly counterfactuals and literary alternates ‒: it is, as 
Hellekson justly points out, widely a question of “[...] narrative techniques that 
fiction and history share.” (Hellekson 2001: 29.) And: “The link between cause 
and effect is always an interpretation made by the person looking.” (Ibid.) (So 
much is evident. Much less is what this has to do with Ricoeur reading Heideg-
ger, of all “philosophers.”) At any rate, too much insistence on subjectivism 
must be exercised with care. 
It is already difficult enough to see to a general consensus concerning the 
evaluation of what we might call the Three Ps: possibility, probability, plausi-
bility ‒ perhaps simply because we don’t dispose of any criteriology in regard 
to things which have either not happened yet or could have happened other-
wise. And, incidentally, there is a major rub here: “it could have happened 
otherwise” is basically an affirmation whereas “what if?” is just a question. 
These two easily differentiable approaches to what should perhaps best be 
called conjectural history are based on rather unacceptable allegations or, alter-
natively, series of queries. The latter variant is by far preferable. 
Hierarchies of probability are challenging to establish and, to a certain ex-
tent, inevitably arbitrary. I think that a way out of the respective dilemmas 
resides in a novel technique which I’d like to refer to as double-ended concate-
nations. Both directions, then, remember. The present perspective being char-
acterized by its focal point of reasoning for the future as well as for the past, 
there are, in a manner of speaking, beams of rays discharged forward and 
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backward, in a retrospective as well as in a prospective manner. That is to say, 
it has to be kept in mind that the inherent uncertainty of the future will always 
be the same at each given point in time. On the other hand, the views from the 
respective observation points are in constant motion and are always directed 
backwards and forwards (which is a constant) while the retrospective percep-
tion changes with each step forward (thus inducing variables). And that, in 
turn, permanently changes the expectations.  
Whether we acknowledge it or not, we always concatenate different pasts, 
regardless of whether they’ve happened or just could have happened, and pro-
ject them unto the future, collating them with future prospects, never mind their 
degree of plausibility. And these possibilities, plausibilities and probabilities ‒ 
the Three Ps of counterfactual history ‒, as we have just noted, are, if at all, 
close to impossible to determine: who’d have seriously expected a catastrophic 
economic crisis only two or three years ago? Still, it would have been nice to 
do something about it ‒ in time. Prerequisite would have been more disciplined 
thinking about the future, learnable not least by counterfactuals. 
To get back ‒ for some concluding arguments ‒ to the example of France’s 
defeat in 1940 (and employing it as a model case). The wavering in regard to 
the inevitability of the defeat (or its contrary) depends on assessments at any 
given moment, implying not least expectancies. Obviously, it is a hindrance to 
think but of inferred French grandeur, past and present, and thus, by extension, 
also expected eminence. If one supposes the defeat of 1940 to be strange, much 
of today’s (and, consequently, tomorrow’s) encumbrances remain more or less 
inexplicable; once one is prepared to see the downfall of 1940 merely as a 
result of inept military leadership, political deadlock and a calamitous general 
morale, today’s problems become comprehensible, thus “soluble”, and tomor-
row’s challenges can at least be faced. 
To arrive at a thinkable retrospective scenario of France successfully fend-
ing off Germany, you have to “posit” a different past ‒ in order to conceptually 
“achieve” those other collective mentalities I’ve been driving at ‒, and you also 
have to be more sanguine about the future because France’s defeatist, morose 
and depressed attitude subsists. Yet most importantly we have to appreciate 
that there are many ways to achieve this “fiction.” In this sense there is symme-
try to past and future histories, seen from the respective focal point of ponder-
ing the countless alternatives which have existed and which will exist. 
The hinge is our present understanding. In regard to the past, our having 
survived 1962 (taken as an example), Robert O’Connell has expressed it like 
this: “Whether [Khrushchev’s alleged] proposal would have allowed the U.S. 
and Soviet leadership to steer away from impending catastrophe remains today 
a matter of speculation” (O’Connell 2003). (I can’t go into the contents of said 
proposal; anyway, in our present context it is just a matter of the “speculation” 
anyway.) We cannot really answer the question: but that must not prevent us 
from posing it. Because it is essential to pose correlative questions in regard to 
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the future, for instance the following one: will it be possible to make non-
proliferation work at least in a way as to preclude terrorists getting free access 
to nuclear devices? That, today, also remains a matter of speculation. The more 
we “speculate” about it ‒ i.e., imagine what even a few terrorist attacks carried 
out with nuclear (or biological and chemical) weapons would actually look like 
and result in ‒, the more meaningful our chances get of doing the things neces-
sary to keep exactly that from happening. 
Naturally, there is the cynical assumption that there is no such thing as his-
torical experience: we can’t “learn” anything from history, we are condemned 
to go on acting in terms of necessities, deterministic courses of history and 
inescapabilities. But that’s exactly the point: our “anticipative thinking” has to 
be developed in ways which make supposedly unforeseeable events at least 
thinkable, and we can learn doing so by studying the past possibilities.  
The very logic of counterfactual thinking consists in contrasting assumable 
options ‒ and then saying, for instance, this or that past alternative is or would 
have been preferable or more plausible. Intelligently assessing possible futures 
necessitates the weighing of alternative options plus considering the past alter-
nates. We can’t change these ‒ but they can teach us to choose in a rational 
way from now on. 
The assumption of a stereotyped, seemingly unchangeable “run of history” ‒ 
supposedly governing expected future experiences as well as unchangeable 
past ones ‒ makes the achievable learning curve depressingly flat. Expectabil-
ity appears as a function of constructive imagination ‒ in regard to the past as 
well as to the future. Without mastering the former, our counterfactuals, there 
are few chances to do better henceforward. We’d be well advised to savvy that 
there is no absolute necessity out there: it might all be over tomorrow, just as it 
is more plausible to state retrospectively ‒ expressed in a paradoxical fashion ‒ 
that “we didn’t survive the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.”  
We should most emphatically insist on “pluralities of the past” ‒ they exist 
anyway in the sense of conflicting, indeed not seldom contradictory interpreta-
tions of History (just think of Pieter Geyl’s book on Napoleon [Geyl 1964]) ‒ 
in order to get a clearer picture of what we, on the one hand, expect from the 
future and what, secondly, we’d wish it to look like. The latter, however, im-
plies the willingness to become proactive on the basis of well defined and 
arguable concepts. If we are not ready to do that, our further social existence 
will lead to nothing but valediction without end. Or simply the end. Period.  
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